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RECONSTRUCTING LIBERTY 
ROBIN WEST· 
INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly and rightly understood in this country that our 
constitutional system ensures, or seeks to ensure, that individuals are 
accorded the greatest degree of personal, political, social, and eco-
nomic liberty possible, consistent with a like amount of liberty given 
to others, the duty and right of the community to establish the 
conditions for a moral and secure collective life, and the responsibility 
of the state to provide for the common defense of the community 
against outside aggression. Our distinctive cultural and constitutional 
commitment to individual liberty places very real restrait;lts on what 
our elected representatives can do, even when they are acting in what 
all of us, or most of us, would consider our collective best interest. 
For example, we cannot outlaw marches by the Ku Klux Klan, I or 
the burning of flags by political extremists ,2 or the anti-Semitic, 
racist, or hateful speech of incendiary and potentially dangerous 
bigoted zealots.3 Nor can we simply outlaw those practices of religious 
sects that may have deleterious effects on the members, such as the 
refusal of certain Amish sects in the Eastern United States to allow 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A., 1976, 
University of Maryland; J.D., 1979, University of Maryland; J.S.D., 1982, Stanford 
Law School. This article was originally a speech delivered on September 6, 1991, 
as the Alumni Distinguished Lecture in Jurisprudence at the University of Tennessee 
College of Law in Knoxville, Tennessee. Early drafts of this speech were presented 
at Notre Dame College in Baltimore, Maryland; The American Philosophical As-
sociation Meeting in New York, New York, January 1992; George Washington Law 
School; and University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. I thank the partici-
pants in those colloquia for their comments and criticisms. 
1. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.) (ordinances in Skokie, 
Illinois, designed to block march by Ku Klux Klan found unconstitutional), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). . 
2. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (federal statute 
criminalizing flag desecration found unconstitutional); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397 (1989) (same result). 
3. See In re R.A. V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn.), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 
2795 (1991). For arguments to the effect that hate speech should not be constitu-
tionally protected, see Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for 
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982); 
Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on 
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: 
ConSidering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989). But see Nadine 
Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposan 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 484. 
441 
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their children to receive a public education past the eighth grade,4 
the explicit exclusion (until recently) of blacks from positions of 
influence in the Mormon Church, or the continuing exclusion of 
women from positions of power, prestige, and influence in our 
dominant, mainstream, Protestant, Catholic, and Judaic faiths. We 
may believe correctly that a full civic education for every individual 
is not only desirable for its own sake but is an absolute prerequisite 
for meaningful participation in our shared political life. We may 
believe that racist speech is antithetical to the racial tolerance nec-
essary to our continued existence as a pluralistic society, that flag-
burning communicates no message worth hearing, and that women 
and blacks are entitled to the opportunity to aspire to positions of 
full participation and responsibility in religious life. Nevertheless, we 
are precluded from legislating in a way that would put the weight 
of the law behind these values because to do so ostensibly would do 
great violence to something we hold even more dear: the right and 
responsibility of the individual to think, speak, and act autonomously 
in matters of religious, political, and social life-to reach one's 
convictions on one's own and for oneself, unfettered by the moral 
dictates of the state, even where those dictates are benign and wise. 
In constitutional discourse, this complex aspiration is often cap-
tured by the phrase "ordered liberty."5 The first thing to note about 
this aspiration of ordered liberty is that it is a relatively modern and 
distinctively liberal interpretation of our constitutional heritage. Thus, 
although Justice Cardozo coined the phrase "ordered liberty" in the 
1930s,6 our modern understanding of ordered liberty protected by 
the Constitution came to full fruition with the liberty-expanding cases 
of the liberal Warren Court era. Quite possibly it received its most 
definitive formulation in the 1960s case Poe v. Ullman.7 Dissenting 
in Poe, Justice Harlan wrote: 
4. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, after balancing 
the state's interest in education against impingement on fundamental right of Amish 
to raise children in manner consistent with religious precepts, the Court held. 
unconstitutional a parent's conviction for refusing to send a child to a public school 
past the eighth grade. [d. at 234. 
The Rehnquist Court, however, may be moving away from the general principle 
cited in the text. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (Oregon 
statute criminalizing nonrecreational drug use held not to infringe First Amendment 
rights of Native American Church members absent showing of specific intent to 
burden the minority religion). 
5. The phrase apparently originated in Justice Cardozo's majority opinion 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). In Palko, the Court held that the kind 
of double jeopardy risked by a state statute permitting the state to appeal criminal 
cases (1) did not "violate those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which 
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,''' id. at 328 (citing Hebert 
v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926»; (2) was not "of the very essence of a 
scheme of ordered liberty," id. at 325; and (3) was not unconstitutional. [d. 
6. [d. at 325. 
7. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
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[Implicit in the concept of ordered liberty are] those rights "which 
are . . . fundamental; which belong . . . to the citizens of all free 
governments" ... for "the purposes [of securing] which men enter 
into society" . . . . 
Due process [which protects such ordered liberty] has not been 
reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by ref-
erence to any code. The best that can be said is that through the 
course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which 
our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the 
individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of 
organized society. . . . 
. . . [T]he liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause . . . is 
not a series of isolated points [represented by the Bill of Rights] .... 
It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a 
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless 
restraints . . . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and 
sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly 
careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridg-
ment.s 
443 
To paraphrase a bit, our modern understanding of ordered liberty 
implies that the state may not interfere with the personal or individual 
decisions that are most fundamental to a free life or with those 
liberties the protection of which is what prompts individuals-or 
would prompt individuals if given the explicit option-to enter civic 
society in the first place. The driving idea behind this notion of 
ordered liberty is that the protection of those liberties by the state 
against its own tendency to intrude in the name of some shared 
political end is of a higher order or of greater importance to civic 
life than any other conceivable and temporal state goal. Which 
particular liberties we view as fundamental and hence requiring this 
constitutional protection against even wise and benign state regulation 
is, of course, a subject of deep and profound disagreement. There 
is, however, a remarkably broad consensus in our contemporary legal 
culture and in our national community generally about the quite 
modern and quite liberal idea or aspiration of ordered liberty: that 
there are some liberties, whatever they may be, so essential to an 
autonomous life that they must be kept free of state control. 
In my comments, I will be largely critical of this understanding 
of ordered liberty, which I occasionally will call the "modern" or 
"liberal" interpretation of our constitutional heritage. I want to 
make two objections to this concept of liberty, one political and one 
historical. The political objection is that the modern conception of 
ordered liberty is a largely empty promise for women. My claim, 
very briefly, will be that even the ideal expressed by this conception 
of ordered liberty-to say nothing of the actual practices it protects-
8. Poe, 367 U.S. at 541-43 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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is skewed against women in a significant manner. The historical 
objection is that the liberal conception of liberty is also a cramped, 
inaccurate understanding of our constitutional history. I will conclude 
by arguing that we could fundamentally reconceive liberty in a more 
generous and explicitly feminist way without doing violence to either 
liberalism or to the document we have inherited. 
Before I embark on the main project, however, one preliminary 
comment is in order. I want to emphasize at the outset what I am 
not doing. By embracing a critical posture toward the generally 
liberal concept of ordered liberty so eloquently spelled out by Justice 
Harlan above and by advocating in its stead a quite different con-
ception, I am not endorsing, and fervently hope not to be understood 
as endorsing, the conservative critique of ordered liberty presently 
being urged in a number of opinions by Justice Antonin Scalia of 
the United States Supreme Court.9 Furthermore, I do not mean to 
embrace the very different conception of that ideal being developed 
in a disturbingly large and growing number of recent Supreme Court 
decisions. 10 My general aim is to argue that the liberal understanding 
of ordered liberty articulated by Justices Cardozo and Harlan and 
given full meaning by the liberty-expanding cases of the Warren 
Court era is unduly cramped and ungenerous. It does not go far 
enough to do what it purports to do on its own terms, which is to 
protect the autonomy and liberty of individuals. Specifically, it does 
not protect the autonomy and liberty of women. 
Justice Scalia's critique is quite the opposite. II Justice Scalia, and 
to a lesser extent his fellow conservative colleagues· on the Court, 
9. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991); Michael 
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). In both cases, Justice Scalia argues that the 
liberty protected by substantive due process should be limited to those liberties 
historically and traditionally protected against precipitous majoritarian abridgment. 
10. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (regulation forbidding 
federally funded clinics to counsel regarding abortion does not violate constitutional 
right of privacy or free speech); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990) 
(state statute requiring notice to both parents regarding abortion request by minors 
held constitutional if accompanied by judicial bypass); Employment. Div. v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990) (state statute criminalizing nonrecreational drug use does not 
violate First Amendment rights of Native American Church members); Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (state statutes regulating abortion 
held constitutional; Roe v. Wade trimester scheme explicitly questioned and arguably 
overruled); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (statute criminalizing homo-
sexual or heterosexual sodomy does not violate constitutional norms of privacy). 
11. According to Justice Scalia, the most important things the Court should 
protect in the name of the liberty protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are not the private decisions that occur in the spheres of 
life necessary to the preservation of true individual autonomy, but rather, the 
decisions or spheres of life that historically and traditionally have been understood 
as insulated against state encroachment. See Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1032; Michael 
H., 491 U.S. at 100. It should be apparent at once that this is a far narrower 
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clearly believes that the liberal understanding of ordered liberty as 
tied to the fundamental needs and interests of the ideally autonomous 
individual is too generous toward the individual. He believes that it 
has unduly limited the sphere of legitimate state control of individual 
liberty and privacy and has granted the individual too much freedom 
vis-a-vis the community and state within which the individual must 
live and be a part. Accordingly, Justice Scalia and his conservative 
colleagues want to shrink the sphere of ordered liberty so as to 
guarantee less liberty and provide more order. By contrast, I would 
like to see us expand that sphere. Unlike Justice Scalia's attack, my 
critique of the liberal understanding of ordered liberty is decidedly 
friendly. 
As the center of power on the Court shifts from the liberal bloc 
of the Warren-Burger years to the conservative bloc of the Rehnquist-
Scalia years, it becomes less clear, of course, what role friendly 
critiques such as the one I intend to offer are to play in our 
constitutional conversations. We are at this moment occupying an 
concept of ordered liberty than that articulated by Justice Harlan in Griswold. See 
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501-02. Instead, it implies a very different and much more 
limited conception of what, concretely, must be protected against state encroachment. 
Stating the idea in the negative, under Justice Scalia's analysis unless a sphere of 
decisionmaking has been historically and traditionally protected, it is not a part of 
the liberty protected against state encroachment. For example, according to this 
approach, neither the so-called liberty to engage in extra-marital sex, premarital sex, 
same-sex relations, or nonreproductive sex, c/. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-95, nor the 
liberty to procure a legal abortion, see Rust, III S. Ct. at 1776-78; Hodgson, 110 
S. Ct. at 2961-72; Webster, 492 U.S. at 532-37, nor the liberty of a father to pursue 
a relationship with a child born to a woman married to another man, see Michael 
H., 491 U.S. at 118-30 (Justice Scalia writing for the Court), nor the liberty of 
worshippers in the Native American Church to ingest peyote as part of religious 
rituals, see Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-90, are a part of the liberty constitutionally 
protected against state encroachment (although all such liberties would be protected 
under Justice Harlan's account of liberty). This is because historically and tradi-
tionally we have not protected these decisions, regardless of whether or not sexual 
life, parental responsibility, or spiritual practices are spheres of decisionmaking 
central to individual autonomy. That we have not historically and traditionally 
protected these liberties, of course, is evidenced by the existence of the sodomy 
laws, fornication laws, prohibitions against homosexuality, and criminalization of 
abortion and nonrecreational drug use challenged in these and similar cases. The 
decisions from the Rehnquist Court over the last five years, partially embracing 
Justice Scalia's approach and truncating or abolishing a wide range of individual 
liberties, substitute tradition for the liberal understanding of autonomy as the 
criterion for determining whether an individual liberty must be protected. This marks 
a profound turning point in the development of our conceptual understanding of 
what ordered liberty requires. 
I discuss the difference between Justice Scalia's approach to liberty and that of 
Justice Brennan and the Warren Court generally in Robin L. West, The Ideal 0/ 
Liberty: A Comment on Micheal H. v. Gerald D., 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1373 (1991). 
See also Michael H., 491 U.S. at 136-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defending the 
more liberal Warren Court approach). 
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ambiguous historical moment with regard to very basic constitutional 
norms. It is not clear whether the liberal understanding of ordered 
liberty briefly spelled out above will survive the conservative revo-
lution on the Court presently underway. Should Justice Scalia's 
reformulation of .ordered liberty-according to which the Constitution 
protects, in the name of liberty, the traditions of our collective past 
rather than the decisions of an ideally autonomous and individual 
life-prove successful, then so-called friendly critiques of the liberal 
understanding of ordered liberty may become, in a constitutional 
sense, simply beside the point. 
On the other hand, if the liberal understanding of ordered liberty 
does survive, then it is imperative that we criticize it and try to 
improve upon it. What I am calling the liberal conception of ordered 
liberty does still dominate constitutional discussion, interpretation, 
and doctrine. It is still the ruling doctrine and is still a fundamental 
part of our constitutional law. It should go without saying (although 
in this time of hyper-patriotism it unfortunately often does not) that 
we best honor the Constitution and the law we create under it not 
by blindly revering its doctrines and certainly not by pledging our 
loyalty to its present form, but by interpreting it, struggling with it, 
criticizing it, setting its goals against itself, and forcing it and us to 
be true to our noblest selves. To the extent that the concept of 
ordered liberty elaborated by the liberal Court during the Warren 
Court years is still a part of the law that governs us, we should 
subject it to criticism so as to improve upon it, the principles it 
articulates, and the societal practices it governs. 
Even if the conservative Court succeeds in replacing the liberal 
aspiration of ordered liberty honored by the Warren Court with the 
very different set of conservative aspirations urged by Justice Scalia, 
friendly critiques of the liberal concept of ordered liberty are still 
important to make and hear. The aspiration of ordered liberty 
imperfectly implemented by the great liberal decisions of the Warren 
Court is not only a constitutional aspiration, important as constitu-
tionalism may be, but also a cornerstone of modern liberal theory. 
As a part of the political theory and of the utopian dream we call 
liberalism, a dream that predates and heavily informs our constitu-
tional ideas and practices, it behooves us to "get it right." We should 
strive to make our conception of ordered liberty the best it can be, 
even if the liberalism of which it is a part survives as only a dissident 
voice, rather than a living part, of our positive constitutional law. 
I. ORDERED LIBERTY 
The liberal and relatively modern conception of ordered liberty I 
want to address has at least two salient features. First, the regime 
of ordered liberty to which we aspire is, to use Isaiah Berlin's famous 
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formulation, a regime of negative rather than positive liberty. 12 It is 
liberty or freedom from, not liberty or freedom to, which the Bill 
of Rights protects. When we speak of ordered liberty, we speak of 
the individual's liberty or freedom from invasion, intrusion, inter-
meddling, or over-regulation rather than the positive liberty or free-
dom to live a particular way, to attain one's full potential, actualize 
one's inner nature, or even govern oneself in a well-run democratic 
or majoritarian system. 13 We generally are not concerned, in our 
constitutional aspiration to ordered liberty, with the freedom that 
comes from being well-fed, clothed, sheltered, educated, or actively 
participating in the laws that govern US. 14 We are concerned instead 
with the freedom to be ourselves within some defined sphere-the 
freedom to make our own decisions, think our own thoughts, worship 
our own deities, and choose our own way of life within some sphere 
the boundaries of which admittedly are not clearly discernible but 
which are absolutely inviolable once drawn. We are concerned with 
the right to be left alone1s and not with the right to any particular 
way to be. Where those boundaries within which we have the right 
to be left alone are to be drawn will be and must be a function of 
our known human nature and, as such, will be debated endlessly. 
That the boundaries must be drawn somewhere, however, is the very 
essence of the liberal interpretation of our Constitution as well as, 
perhaps, the very essence of modern liberalism. The political philos-
opher Isaiah Berlin describes negative liberty in this way: 
[S]ome portion of human existence must remain independent of the 
sphere of social control. To invade that preserve, however small, 
would be despotism .... We must preserve a minimum area of 
personal freedom if we are not to "degrade or deny our na-
ture" .... What then must the minimum be? That which a man 
cannot give up without offending against the essence of his human 
nature. What is this essence? What are the standards which it 
entails? This has been, and perhaps always will be, a matter of 
infinite debate. But whatever the principle in terms of which the 
area of non-interference is to be drawn, whether it is that of natural 
12. See SIR ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts oj Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON 
LIBERTY 118 (1969). 
13. Id. at 121-22. 
14. Thus, so-called welfare rights are not protected constitutionally. See, e.g., 
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Hyde Amendment prohibiting federal funding 
of abortions for the poor upheld as constitutional); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (no constitutional right to an education). See generally 
Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 659 (1979) [hereinafter Welfare Rights]; Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: 
On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 
(1969). 
15. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890). 
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law or natural rights, or of utility or the pronouncement of a 
categorical imperative, or the sanctity of the social contract, ... 
liberty in this sense means liberty from; absence of interference 
beyond the shifting, but always recognizable, frontier. 16 
With only a few exceptions, most notably the right to vote 
guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment, the ordered liberty that the 
Constitution protects, according to the modern conception, is our 
negative liberty to be left alone and not our positive liberty to food, 
shelter, a job or an income, or to a fulfilled, prosperous, meaningful, 
and self-governed life. The constitutional preference for negative over 
positive liberty is captured by the oft-made claim that the Constitution 
itself is a negative one. The Constitution, it is said, protects our 
negative rights to be free from intrusion instead of our positive rights 
to a positively free, active, involved, civic, or healthy existence. The 
Constitution at least according to its modern interpreters, is a shield 
of protection; it is not a sword of entitlement. 
The second feature of the modern conception of ordered liberty 
has its origins not in liberal theory, but in constitutional doctrine. 
By ordered liberty, we aspire to a regime that respects the negative 
freedom of the individual, and more specifically, to a regime that 
respects the negative freedom of the individual from undue inter-
meddling or interference from one and only one source-the state. 17 
16. BERLIN, supra note 12, at 126-27. Although it is a common belief that 
negative liberty and positive liberty are two sides of the same coin or in some way 
are correlated with each other, this need not be the case, as Berlin tried to show in 
his famous essay. [d. at 131. A society can be rich in one kind of liberty but poor 
in the other. For example, as individual citizens, we might enjoy a great deal of 
negative freedom such as the right to speak, worship, or be free of arbitrary arrest 
even though we live in a virtual dictatorship. A dictator may decide in the interest 
of stability or for relatively more benign reasons to grant citizens a broad sphere 
of inviolable freedom within which they may do as they please, even though they 
have no say in the governance of the society, no vote, and no right to political 
representation or participation. In such a society, the individual would enjoy extensive 
negative liberty but no positive liberty. 
On the other hand, a society might be a perfectly functioning democracy, in 
fact as well as theory, yet it may grant absolutely no negative freedom to the 
individual citizen. This was the possibility that major classical liberal thinkers from 
Mill to Berlin both saw and feared in western democracies. A governing majority, 
perfectly representative of the public's will, might decide to strip individuals of all 
negative freedom and dictate on ideological grounds what individuals should think 
and believe, what they should read, and how and who they should worship. Such 
a society might be rich in positive freedom but poor in negative freedom. As Mill 
insisted, insuring to each and every individual an equal power to oppress others is 
no guarantee of liberty. A majority, no less than a tyrant, can squelch the negative 
freedom necessary for individuality, genius, creativity, spontaneity, and life itself to 
flourish. See generally JOHN STUART Mu.L, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
17. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 
U.S. 189 (1989) (constitutional guarantee to liberty triggered by state action, not by 
mere inaction); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (same). 
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Accordingly, the Constitution, the document on which we rely to 
give teeth to our aspirations, overwhelmingly is concerned with the 
potential for oppression in the relationship between the individual 
and both federal and state government. It does not, then, address 
the potential for oppression between the individual and other forms 
of organized social authority, such as the corporate employer, the 
trade union, the family, or the church, which also may infringe upon 
an individual's negative freedom. In other words, the constitutional 
. dictate of ordered liberty places limits only on the state's potential 
for control. This second principle is what is often referred to in 
constitutional doctrine as the state action requirement. The consti-
tutional guarantee of negative liberty is not triggered unless the state 
has acted in some way that infringes a protected and fundamental 
right. If we put these two principles together the modern conception 
of ordered liberty means that the Constitution protects the negative 
liberty of the individual against excessive intrusion by the state, by 
state officials, or, at the outer extreme, authorities acting under color 
of state authority. 
Constitutional law is an admittedly complex subject, and the 
following generalities are subject to a host of exceptions. Neverthe-
less, from these two basic premises-that the liberty protected by 
our constitutional aspirations is negative, rather than positive, and 
that it is only liberty from state action and not liberty from other 
sources of social authority that is protected-we can generate not 
only much of the modern content, but more importantly for these 
purposes, most of the limits of our specific constitutional guarantees. 
From the first principle-that the Constitution protects negative 
rather that positive liberty-we can generate the limits the Court has 
imposed on the substance of the rights that the Constitution protects. 
We are guaranteed the freedom to speak, believe, associate or not 
associate with others, but we are not guaranteed an education, 18 
adequate shelter, clothing, food, a job, or an income}9 The former 
are negative freedoms while the latter, often called welfare rights, 
are examples of positive liberties and, hence, not protected. 20 We are 
guaranteed the freedom to send our children to a private school of 
our choice, if we can afford it, free of state interference to the 
contrary because this is easily characterized as a negative freedom.21 
18. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
19. On the need to create constitutional entitlements to these so-called welfare 
rights and arguments to the effect that the Constitution should guarantee them, see 
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: THE DIARY OF A LAW 
PROFESSOR (1991); Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 14. 
20. See generally Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 14, at 659-60. 
21. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (finding statute 
requiring public rather than private education of children an unconstitutional in-
fringement of the "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control"). 
HeinOnline -- 59 Tenn. L. Rev. 450 1991-1992
450 TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 59 
It is a part of the very general freedom to contract as one pleases 
without state interference-perhaps the quintessential negative liberty 
in a market economy-as well as the right to raise one's children 
according to one's own preferences without state interference.22 We 
are not, however, guaranteed the right to a private school education 
regardless of ability to payor even to a quality public school 
education. 23 The so-called right to an education is a positive freedom 
and, therefore, is not protected. We are still guaranteed (albeit 
narrowly) the right to procure contractually an abortion,24 if we can 
afford one, because this is a negative freedom and part of our right 
to be left alone. We are not guaranteed the right to an abortion 
whether or not we can pay for it because that would be a positive 
freedom and would not be protected.25 We are not even guaranteed 
the right to abortion counseling, for that, too, would be a positive 
right and, hence, not protected.26 We are (more or less) guaranteed 
the right to read whatever we wish within the confines of our own 
home, but we are not guaranteed the right to literacy. The former 
is part of the negative right to be left alone while the latter is, if 
anything, part of a positive concept of liberty. The general rule I 
am suggesting is this: The Constitution guarantees us the right to do 
certain things free of interference from social authority, but it does 
not guarantee us the absolute right to do those same things. The 
negative freedom that is the concern of the Constitution extends only 
to the right to procure goods or develop abilities free of interference 
from social authority. It does not positively guarantee the individual 
the goods themselves or access to the goods or access to the ability 
or skills necessary to procure them. 
We can generate the limits of the scope of the rights the Consti-
tution protects from the second principle-that the negative freedom 
which is the concern of the Constitution extends only to negative 
freedom against interference from the state, what is typically called 
the state action requirement. Weare protected, for example, against 
22. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state law prohibiting the 
teaching of any modern language other than English unconstitutionally infringes 
freedom of parents to oversee children's upbringing and education). 
23. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,22-24 (1973). 
24. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
25. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (federal law withholding funds 
for even medically necessary abortions upheld; no general constitutional right to an 
abortion, only right to contract for abortion free of state interference); Maher v. 
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (equal protection clause does not compel state to pay for 
medically necessary abortions although state may pay for indigent women's childbirth 
expenses). 
26. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
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the state's censorship of certain ideas or modes of expression. Were 
a .state to criminalize the utterance of communist, atheistic, Catholic, 
feminist, or white supremacist beliefs, such a statute most certainly 
would be ruled unconstitutional. We are not protected, however, 
against censorship of those same ideas by private publishers.27 Should 
the major publishers determine that certain ideas-communist, fem-
inist, pacifist-do not sell and, therefore, decide not to publish, or 
should the media decide that certain points of view-critical per-
spectives on the Persian Gulf War, for example-decrease ratings 
and, therefore, decide not to air them, effectively censoring from the 
public discourse those contributions, there has been an unquestionable 
censoring of ideas from the public sphere. Nevertheless, there has 
been no constitutional violation.28 In fact, according to some com-
mentators, Congress's attempts to correct for this private censorship 
and impose upon private media obligations of fairness may be a 
constitutional violation of the private media's right to uncensored 
expression.29 Consequently, while we all are protected against a wide 
range of official state censorship, women are not protected against 
the censorial, silencing effect of a pornography industry run amok,30 
and African-Americans are not protected against the similarly silenc-
ing effect of racist hate speech31-the murder of the spirit, to use 
the expression coined by law professor Patricia Williams.32 Similarly, 
while we are constitutionally protected against police violence and 
brutality, we receive no constitutional protection against violence and 
brutality from a fellow citizen, an abusive spouse, a lover, or a 
parent. Of course, the state's criminal law mayor may not accord 
27. See Hudnut v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), 
aji'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). For a discussion of the injurious consequences of 
private-market censorship of unpopular ideas, see Louise Armstrong, Dissent jor 
the Duration . .. : Louise Armstrong Talks to Andrea Dworkin, WOMEN'S REVIEW 
OF BOOKS, May 1986, at 5. 
28. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (refusal of CBS to 
accept DNC's editorial advertisements did not violate latter's constitutional rights). 
According to the Court in CBS, to limit journalistic discretion in the name of First 
Amendment rights would be "anomalous" and a "contradiction." Id. at 120, 121. 
29. The Court upheld the fairness doctrine, a complex set of regulations 
imposing obligations on broadcasters to provide balanced treatment of opposing 
points of view, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), but 
the case has generated a vast array of criticism. See, e.g., Kenneth Karst, Equality 
as a Central Principle. in the First Amendment, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20 (1975); L.A. 
Powe, Jr., "Or oj the {Broadcast} Press," 55 TEX. L. REV. 39 (1976). 
30. See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 328-34. See generally CATHERINE MACKINNON, 
Pornography: On Morality and Politics, in TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE 
STATE 195-214 (1989) [hereinafter FEMINIST THEORY]. 
31. In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn.), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 3823 
(U.S. June 10, 1991) (No. 90-7675). 
32. Wn.LIAMS, supra note 19, at 73. Williams is perhaps our only eloquent 
contemporary poet-lawyer. 
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us protection from such private violence, but whether it does or not 
is of no constitutional moment. Even if the state does nothing to 
protect us against such violence, there has been no constitutional 
violation. So long as the violence came from a private citizen, there 
has been no state action. At worst, there has been only state inaction, 
and that, as the Supreme Court has made clear, is simply not enough. 
The citizen, we might say, has no constitutional right to a police 
force. 33 
To recapitulate, the modern concept of ordered liberty governing 
the great bulk of our modern constitutional law is constituted by, 
and limited by, two principles: (1) the philosophical and political 
notion that there is some sphere of individual conduct, belief, and 
expression that should be inviolable against the intrusion, interven-
tion, or interference of social authority; and (2) the more purely 
constitutional (and distinctively American) notion that the individual's 
negative freedom has been infringed wrongly only if it is the state, 
rather than some other social authority or private force, responsible 
for the infringement. Before beginning my critique, it may be worth 
noting one general logical feature of the liberal concept of ordered 
liberty as I have just described it. Contrary to a widespread misun-
derstanding, the two principles that constitute and limit the modern 
understanding of ordered liberty-the preference for negative liberty 
and the state action requirement-are logically independent of each 
other. Not only is the state action requirement not required by the 
preference for negative over positive liberty, but in many cases, it is 
fundamentally at odds with it. If we are truly concerned with the 
negative freedom of individuals, then we should be concerned with 
unnecessary limitations on our interference with those freedoms what-
ever the source, whether it be the state or some other form of 
organized social authority. There surely are forms of organized social 
authority that are at times more intrusive, more interventionist, more 
controlling, and more interfering with an individual's right to be left 
alone than the state. Indeed, it may only be through state intervention 
that these private infringements of the individual's negative liberty 
can be addressed. 
Imagine, for example, the profound interference with the negative 
liberty to do, think, act, believe and say as one pleases, worked by 
some Mormon communities on the developing sense of self and 
society of thirteen- or fourteen-year-old adolescent girls, primed by 
their parents and their community not for participatory and auton-
omous adulthood, but for continuing infantilization and dependency 
through a too-early marriage. Imagine the similar effect on the 
negative liberty of the Amish child occasioned by the Amish com-
33. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 
189, 196-97 (1989). 
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munity's refusal to allow their children a high school education. 
There may be reasons, even compelling reasons, for insisting that 
the state ought not interfere with the practices of these insular 
religious communities. We may value religious diversity in these 
subcommunities for their own sake, as Mill urged that we should.34 
Alternatively, we may fear the sort of spill-over consequences of 
unleashing state power on such groups. I am not arguing for greater 
control of these religious minorities. What I insist on is the more 
limited point that whatever the argument might be for noninterven-
tion by the state into the freedom of these religious groups to oppress 
their individual members, it cannot be based on the principle of 
negative liberty standing alone, for that principle often will cut the 
other way. Although the negative freedom of groups or subcom-
munities to be left alone might be furthered, the individual's negative 
freedom is hurt, not helped, by the state's policy of nonintervention 
into these private spheres of communal coercion, intimidation, and 
controPS True devotion to the principle of negative liberty should 
sometimes counsel for state intervention into private relations and 
sometimes counsel against it. There is no necessary connection be-
tween the respect for individual autonomy, which informs our com-
mitment to negative liberty, and the fear of excessive state control, 
which informs' our constitutional state action doctrine. Both com-
mitments might be justified, but they must be justified on independent 
grounds; neither follows from the other. 
II. ORDERED LIBERTY AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 
Whatever its internal logic, the modern conception of ordered 
liberty currently guiding constitutional law has not served women 
well. The reason is simple enough: the modern conception of ordered 
liberty does not capture and, so long as the modern interpretation 
dominates, the Constitution does not guarantee the liberties that 
women peculiarly lack in this country. As a consequence, the con-
straints under which women distinctively live are not those prohibited 
by constitutional mandate. In a formal sense, the problem is twofold. 
First, many of the liberties women lack are positive rather than 
negative and not protected for that reason. Second, whether char-
acterized as positive or negative, the constraints that limit women's 
liberty typically are not imposed by the state, but by private and 
34. Mill specifically defended the polygamous practices of the Mormons on 
just these grounds, but he did so without considering, and perhaps not noticing, 
that those practices endanger the very individual liberties specifically defended in 
near absolute terms in earlier sections of his famous essay. See Mn.L; ON LIBERTY, 
supra note 16, at 73. 
35. We unduly flatter these spheres with the appellation "community." 
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sometimes very private, even intimate, relationships and are not 
prohibited for that reason. Indeed, the mismatch between the liberty 
protected by the Constitution and the liberty women distinctively 
lack is so great as to make the Constitution irrelevant at best and 
often a positive danger to women's lives. From the perspective of 
women's liberty, it is truly not clear at this point in our history 
whether the Constitution and the ordered liberty it protects is worthy 
of celebration or a part of an immense societal problem that still 
remains to be solved.36 
I will give two examples of the general incompatibility of women's 
needs and our ruling, liberal conception of ordered liberty. If we 
look directly at contemporary women's lives, we can identify two 
constraints within which women live quite distinctively and which 
disproportionately limit our freedom. First, women, far more than 
men, live within the constraints of gender roles assigning to women 
far greater responsibility for child-raising and domestic labor. 37 This 
is what Arlie Hochschild provocatively calls the "second shift" 
phenomenon: women, in effect, work two jobs in this society to a 
man's one. One of these jobs is often underpaid, and the second, 
the domestic shift, is utterly unpaid. 38 Consequently, by virtue of 
their unequal responsibility for domestic and child-care labor, women 
find it difficult or impossible to be economically self-sufficient through 
participation in the paid labor market or to be involved in the public 
sphere of political decisionmaking. There are a limited number of 
hours in a day, and so long as women continue to work two jobs 
to a man's one, and continue to be trained to willingly accept this 
inequity and men trained to expect it, women will find it propor-
tionately more difficult than men to live otherwise autonomous, 
politically engaged, economically self-sufficient lives. As long as there 
is laundry to wash, diapers to change, children to feed, houses to 
clean, and meals to make, and as long as women disproportionately 
are doing it, there is that much less time for women to vote, 
campaign, hold public office, sit on boards, create art and culture, 
and live otherwise positively free lives.39 Just as important, so long 
36. That is, if women are ever to be men's equals in the civic, economic, 
and private spheres in which we live out our lives. 
37. See generally ARLIE HOCHSCHD..D, THE SECOND SHIFf: WORKING PARENTS 
AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND 
THE FAMILY (1989); Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Review Essay-The Politics 
of Workplace Reforms: Recent Works on Parental Leave and a Father-Daughter 
Dialogue, 40 RUTGERS L. REv. 1031 (1988); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: 
Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARIZ. L. REv. 431 (1990); Jana Singer, Women's 
Work, REp. FROM THE INST. FOR PHD... AND PUB. POL'y no. 1, 11 (Winter 1991). 
38. See HOCHSCHlLD, supra note 37. 
39. For an eloquent treatment of the conflict between mothering and the 
production of culture, see TILLIE OLSEN, SILENCES 203-12 (1978). 
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as women are and feel responsible for these tasks, the absolutely 
obvious incompatibility of that work with the positive liberty praised 
by classical liberals40 and modern civic republicans41 alike-full, 
rounded, independent, politically participatory lives led in the public 
sphere-will continue to imply for and to women the inescapable 
message that we are unsuitable for the liberty men expect and often 
(but not always) receive as a matter of course. Indeed, as suggested 
by the sixties term "Women's Liberation," the fact that women find 
political participation and economic self-sufficiency a much more 
illusive goal than men might be described as the most important 
finding of the second wave of twentieth-century feminism that cap-
tured our collective political imagination in the 1960s and early 
1970s.42 
Second, women live within the constraints of a high risk of sexual 
violence and a pervasive fear of sexual violence inhibiting our actions 
in the public world and coloring our inner lives in the private.43 This 
greater vulnerability obviously compromises women's physical secu-
rity and psychological well-being in many ways of which I will 
mention only a few. First, both the violence itself and the fear of 
sexual violence quite obviously and dramatically limit women's free-
dom to move about physically in our community to a much greater 
extent than such a fear limits men.44 Second, sexual violence and 
fear of sexual violence also drastically limit our choices and even 
our perception of our choices of ways to live. 45 It makes marriage 
appear to be much safer and, hence, more desirable than it is. It 
makes nonmarital life styles-single, celibate, lesbian-both appear 
to be and in fact to be quite dangerous to say nothing of socially 
unacceptable. Third, sexual violence and the fear of it limit many 
women's enjoyment of sexuality, and this, too, should be understood 
as a very real cost. Most damaging, however, fear of sexual violence, 
like fear generally, infantilizes women and leaves us more vulnerable, 
both in our own perceptions of ourselves and in others' perceptions 
of us. The fear, as much as the actual violence, badly cripples 
women's sense of ourselves and societal perceptions of us as auton-
40. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1863); MILL, ON LmERTY, supra 
note 16. 
41. Frank I. Micheiman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). 
42. See, e.g., BETTY FRIEDAN, FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1983); SIMONE DE BEAU-
VOIR, THE SECOND SEX (1952). 
43. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 30, at 195-
214; CATHERINE MACKINNON, A Rally Against Rape and Sex and Violence: A 
Perspective, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 81-93 (1987) 
[hereinafter FEMINISM UNMODIFIED); DIANE E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1982). 
44. MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RrGER, THE FEMALE FEAR (1989). 
45. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in 5 
SIGNS: JOURNAL OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 631-60 (Summer 1980). 
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omous, free and independent agents. For women in abusive marriages 
and intimate relationships, this infantilization and depersonalization 
is most extreme. In such relationships, sexual violence and the fear 
of it can strip away virtually all sense of self-possession. The re-
peatedly abused woman becomes, in fact as well as in self-image, a 
means, rather than an end, to the fulfillment of another's desires. 
She quite literally lacks the capacity to be herself when she has been 
put under the sovereign will of a. violent and violence-prone partner. 46 
More generally, the fear of the potential for sexual violence from 
husbands, partners, potential partners, acquaintances, or strangers 
leaves all women, not just abused wives and rape victims, consider-
ably more vulnerable, more dependent, and more constrained than 
our brothers, fathers, sons, and husbands. 
Both the constraint of unequal parenting and the constraint of 
sexual violence profoundly limit women's political participation, ec-
onomic self-sufficiency, physical security, and psychological well-
being-or, in a word, women's autonomy. Both constraints limit 
some central aspect of women's liberty. What I want to show now 
is that in spite of the tremendous threat these constraints pose to 
women's liberty, neither of them, given the dominant, liberal under-
standing of ordered liberty, is particularly vulnerable to constitutional 
challenge or within the ambit of constitutional concern. Even worse, 
the societal conditions that facilitate and at times constitute these 
constraints may have constitutional protection, in the name of pro-
tecting negative liberty, against political or legal change. Let me 
comment on each of these constraints in a little more detail, showing 
why they are largely unamenable to constitutional challenge and why 
the social practices from which they arise may even be constitutionally 
protected. 
I start with women's unequal parenting responsibility and the 
constraint it imposes on women's political and economic autonomy. 
Whatever else one might want to say about this particular constraint 
on women's lives, this much is clear: However unjust it may be and 
however pervasive its restrictive impact on women's potential, given 
the modern understanding of ordered liberty under the Constitution, 
the Constitution holds no promise of correcting it for two reasons. 
The first should be obvious enough from the way I have labelled the 
problem. The kind of autonomy of which women are deprived by 
virtue of the unequal distribution and unequal recognition of and 
compensation for domestic labor is almost paradigmatically positive 
rather than negative. It is the freedom to live a certain kind of 
involved, public, political, and economic life, not freedom from any 
46. I have explored this in more detail elsewhere. See Robin L. West, The 
Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist 
Legal Theory, 3 WIse. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987). 
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particular kind of intrusion. It is the freedom to be, in the fullest 
sense, a citizen that is threatened in part by women's unequal 
responsibility for parenting the young. So long as we continue to 
pledge our allegiance to a Constitution that protects negative but not 
positive liberty, the tremendous constraints imposed upon women's 
public lives by their unequal responsibilities for domestic labor will 
never rise to a constitutional magnitude. Whether or not it is unjust, 
it is not an injustice for which the Constitution as it is presently 
understood demands compensation. 
Second, regardless of whether the liberty women lack by virtue 
of unequal and unpaid parenting is negative or positive, women's 
unequal parenting and domestic responsibility is still largely invul-
nerable to constitutional challenge because of the state action re-
quirement. One need not be a naive adherent to a falsely innocent 
conception of the state to infer from the cross-cultural breadth of 
the problem and transgenerational depth of the problem that the 
assignment to women of disproportionate child-raising labor, domes-
tic chores, and of a lesser role in public life is made not by any 
particular state or state official but by a complex, transsocietal, and 
transgenerational web of shared understandings about the nature of 
women and men, women's natural capacity for motherhood and 
disinclination for the life of the citizen, artist, intellectual, artisan, 
or wage-paid laborer, and men's societal inclination for all of the 
above and natural disinclination for parenting. We might, for pur-
poses of brevity, call this complex, transsocietal, transgenerational 
web of shared understandings "patriarchy." My point is that patri-
archy, so defined, is not (or certainly is not entirely) a product of 
state action no matter how broadly we might define either concept. 
Patriarchy infects not only our laws, but also our private lives and 
relations. It springs not only from our legal system, but also from 
our private orderings. Although the state may have from time to 
time in our history exacerbated it, legitimated it, enforced it, and 
may in some ways continue to do so, the state did not create 
patriarchy. For that fundamental reason, simply ending the state's 
complicity with it will not cure it. Women living in a state whose 
law is rigorously neutral toward women and men still will find 
themselves burdened by the inequality and injustice of a private 
regime of patriarchal control. Women will still find themselves unable 
to live the positively free life of the citizen because of it. 
Simply put, if patriarchy persists at least to some degree and in 
some of its manifestations without benefit of state action,47 there 
simply is no constitutional violation, so long as we understand the 
Constitution to protect only our right to be free of state intervention. 
47. In the example of unequal distribution in the private nuclear family of 
child-raising responsibility, there may well be no state action. 
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Regardless of whether the unjust distribution of labor and respon-
sibility in the family sphere constrains women's positive liberty to 
full citizenship and autonomy or women's negative liberty to choose 
a way of life free of social authoritarian intervention, there is nothing 
unconstitutional in the injustice. The Constitution is silent on the 
many constraints, injustices, and inequalities perpetuated on women 
by the private forces we understand as patriarchal. In short, patri-
archy is constitutional to the extent that it is autonomous from state 
control and creation. 
The difficulty goes even deeper, however. Not only is patriarchy 
not unconstitutional, but, to the degree that patriarchy is woven into 
the fabric and pattern of our most private intimate lives, it may be 
even constitutionally protected. The Court has held repeatedly that 
our negative liberty to be free of state intervention at a minimum 
contains the liberty to create a private, familial life in whatever way 
the individual deems best and in line with her own beliefs about the 
meaning and content of the good life.48 The central and liberal 
understanding that whatever else negative liberty protects it must 
protect the relations of our intimate and familial lives typically is 
captured in one word: privacy. Because the Constitution protects our 
familial privacy, it arguably protects our access to birth control,49 
our right to procure an abortion,50 to attend the private school of 
our choice,51 and, in general, to make whatever decisions we deem 
best about the way our children are raised. 52 That privacy, however, 
comes with a terrible and often terrifying price to women. If, as a 
number of feminists now contend, private life is the home of 
patriarchy53-if patriarchal control of women's choices and patriar-
chal domination of women's inner and public lives occur in the very 
private realm of home life-then the Constitution, above all else, 
protects the very system of power and control that constrains us. 
The complex system of ties peculiarly binding women and not men 
may be not only not unconstitutional, but positively constitutionally 
protected. If so, then the Constitution is not only not a shield against 
48. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The 
privacy cases, which protect traditional, patriarchal, familial arrangements (both 
nuclear and otherwise and with the exception of the abortion decision), all protect 
private and social practices that have a pronounced negative impact on women's 
self-esteem, self-definition, and self-worth. See MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra 
note 30, at 184-95 (similar critique of the Court's privacy doctrine as insulating 
patriarchy). 
49. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. 
50. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). 
51. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. 
52. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-34 (1972). 
53. This is what is meant by the phrase "the personal is political." See 
generally MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 30, at 41, 94-95, 119-20. 
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injustice for women, but is itself a sword of injustice pointed very 
markedly at women. It is part of the problem, not part of the 
solution. 
The constraint on women's liberty occasioned by sexual violence, 
like that imposed by gender roles, is also not amenable to constitu-
tional challenge under current constitutional interpretation. Unlike 
the constraint of gender roles, sexual violence might be a constraint 
on negative rather than positive liberty. As was the case with gender 
roles, however, the constraint on liberty occasioned by sexual violence 
is not a constraint directly worked by state action. Instead, it is a 
constraint imposed by men. Although the state unarguably aggravates 
the harm by casual, lax, or nonexistent enforcement of the criminal 
laws against sexual violence,s4 it is the sexual violence actually per-
petrated by men-strangers, acquaintances, dates, lovers, and hus-
bands-rather than irrational or abusive states or state officials that 
most profoundly limits women's liberty. To put the same point 
affirmatively, while we have a panoply of rights protecting us against 
abusive and violent action by the state, we do not have a constitu-
tional right to be free of sexual violence. Because of the so-called 
state action requirement, the profound infringement of women's 
liberty by sexual violence violates no constitutional right of sexual 
security, invokes no constitutional norm of ordered liberty, and 
triggers no constitutionally significant obligations. There is simply 
no real constitutional issue. 
Thus, (and this is the central point of my critique) because the 
fear of sexual violence is not a fear of abusive state action, it is of 
absolutely no constitutional consequence. In the extreme case, ar-
guably no constitutional guarantee would be breached were the state 
to cease enforcing entirely its criminal laws dealing with sexual 
violence. This would be an example of state inaction, not state 
action; and although it would undoubtedly give rise to constitutional 
litigation, there would be no clear-cut argument supporting such a 
challenge. The bottom line is that our constitutional guarantee of 
ordered liberty-our constitutional right to be free of abusive, irra-
tional, or unnecessary infringement of our individual freedom-is a 
largely empty promise for women. It addresses what is, at worst, a 
marginal problem. in women's lives and leaves absolutely untouched 
the most glaring source of bondage. 
In the case of the constraints of sexual violence no less than the 
constraints imposed by gender roles, the problem is not just that the 
constraint on freedom is not unconstitutional, or put affirmatively, 
54. A dramatic example is the so-called marital rape exemption, which 
exempts wives from the protection of rape law and exempts husbands from its 
reach. See Robin L West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REv. 45 (1990) [hereinafter Equality Theory]. 
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that we do not have a constitutional right to be protected against 
sexual assault. The problem is deeper than that. If the state were to 
take affirmative actions to address sexual violence and the violence 
that women suffer within intimate relations and private homes in 
particular, such action may itself be unconstitutional or, at least, 
raise constitutional problems. In the interest of the individual's 
negative liberty to do, think, speak, and act as he or she pleases, 
the Constitution generally protects the liberty of the individual against 
excessive or overzealous criminalization of private life and protects 
a realm of privacy (typically as co-extensive with family life) within 
which it is extremely difficult for the state to intrude. I am not 
saying that it would be unconstitutional for the state or for the 
federal government to undertake legislative action addressing the 
problem of domestic abuse or sexual violence. If it should do so 
through criminalization, however, both the general concept and the 
particular conception of the Constitution as the guardian of individual 
liberty against the criminal arm of the state would burden and limit 
its efforts. 
The general problem, of which gender roles and sexual violence 
are but two examples, is that the modern Constitution, in the name 
of ordered liberty, defines, insulates, and then protects a realm of 
individual privacy within which the state may not intrude. It is within 
that very realm, however, that the subordination of women through 
violence and the threat of violence, through the assumption of 
unequal parenting obligations, and through the imposition of restric-
tive gender roles occurs most egregiously. Weare left with this 
uncomfortable and possibly life-threatening constitutional paradox. 
The Constitution protects and guarantees ordered liberty, but it does 
not secure women's liberty. The Constitution protects the ,individual 
against abusive and violent state conduct, but not only does it not 
protect women against the abuse and violence that most threatens 
them, it perversely protects the sphere of privacy and liberty within 
which the abuse and violence takes place. 
The deep incongruity between our modern liberal conception of 
ordered liberty and women's needs does, of course, have historical 
parallels. Throughout history, in fact, feminists have felt ambivalent 
about the Bill of Rights-from Abigail Adams' futile attempt to urge 
her husband to include women's interests,55 if not rights, in the early 
drafting of the original document to the late nineteenth-century 
abolitionist feminists' bitter disappointment with the Reconstruction 
Congress's refusal to include women's equality in the vision of social 
55. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (March 31, 1776), in THE 
ADAMS PAPERS: ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE, DEC. 1761 - MAY 1776, 369-70 
(L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1963). See also ALICE S. ROSSI, THE FEMINIST PAPERS: 
FROM ADAMS TO BEAUVOIR 7-15 (1973). 
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justice embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. s6 The modern Con-
stitution, however, informed by the distinctively modern liberal un-
derstanding of ordered liberty, does not only ignore women-although 
it does do that. It positively protects the sphere of privacy, negative 
liberty, and individual freedom within which women are most vul-
nerable and within which women are uniquely, individually, and 
definitively oppressed. S7 Thus, through its commitment to a liberal 
and modern conception of liberty, the contemporary Constitution 
not only fails to protect women's needs and aspirations, but affir-
matively protects the sphere of privacy and conduct within which 
women's subordination occurs. 
III. LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND AUTONOMY 
There are two possible ways of addressing this conflict between 
women's needs, interests, and aspirations and our presently dominant, 
liberal interpretation of ordered liberty. The first of these, which I 
will call the egalitarian response, has become the near-standard 
response of feminist constitutional lawyers. It is, I believe, deeply 
flawed. The second has not received as much development, but may 
ultimately have more promise. 
The egalitarian response begins with this correct and telling 
observation: The tension between women's interests and the modern 
interpretation of ordered liberty is not unique to women but, instead, 
exemplifies a much larger and deeper phenomenon, which is the 
tension, conflict, and contradiction between our constitutional com-
mitment to liberty on the one hand and our political commitment to 
equality on the other. S8 The conflict is not, in other words, between 
women's liberty and ordered liberty, as I have been describing it, 
but between equality and liberty. Individual liberty, no matter how 
construed, always comes at the cost of equality. Individual liberty, 
so to speak, "frees up" the sphere of action within which private 
individuals oppress each other. As the New Deal constitutionalists 
and liberals saw it, "freeing up" individual liberty in the economic 
sphere exacerbates and exaggerates differences in wealth between 
owners and laborers. Achieving some more egalitarian distribution 
of income requires limiting the negative liberty of individual economic 
actors. Similarly, in our own time, "freeing up" the negative liberty 
of individuals to say exactly what they please, no matter how racist, 
56. ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVE-
MENT IN THE UNITED STATES 145-50 (1975). 
57. See Mary Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of 
"Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective __ U. CHI. L. R. __ (1992). 
58. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also West, Ideal of Liberty, 
supra note 11. 
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hateful, incendiary, or vicious exacerbates the harms of the worst 
kind of virulent racism still visited upon African-Americans in our 
society and, consequently, widens the social inequality between the 
white majority and the black minority.59 By allowing the individual 
a free rein in matters of speech, we subject members of racial 
minorities to injurious, belittling, sometimes emotionally crippling 
forms of racial insult-speech that we can all agree has absolutely 
no redeeming value. Likewise, by leaving the individual free to speak, 
hear, sell, or purchase whatever he or she wishes, we free up the 
multimillion dollar pornography industry to endanger women's self-
image, lives, and safety through violent imagery that arguably in-
creases the risk of sexual violence in an already violent society. By 
freeing the individual to act absolutely as he wishes within the privacy 
of his own home, we endanger the well-being and often the lives of 
children at the whim and mercy of sometimes less than loving parents. 
Examples could be multiplied. 
The lesson to be learned from these conflicts, according to this 
view, is that increases in individual liberty generally come at the cost 
of decreases in equality. Put somewhat differently, according to the 
egalitarian critique, individual liberty invariably exacerbates, rather 
than ameliorates, the subordination of some groups by others-of 
women by men, of blacks by whites, of workers by capitalists-and, 
accordingly, widens the gap in power, prestige, and wealth between 
these groups. Liberty and equality, on this view, are in an inevitable 
tension: we cannot increase one without jeopardizing the other. If 
we want to do something real about equalizing men and women or 
blacks and whites, we will have to limit, somewhat, individual 
freedom; and if we want to increase individual liberty, we will have 
to jeopardize, to some degree, equality. To whatever extent we are 
constitutionally "constituted by" commitments to both ordered lib-
erty and the civic, political, or, at least, formal equality of men and 
women, capitalists and laborers, and blacks and whites, we are 
committed inescapably to contradictory ideals. 
The conflict I have been discussing between our modern under-
standing of ordered liberty and women's needs, on this view, simply 
partakes of this same general pattern. As noted above, "freeing up" 
speech facilitates the harms done to women through the propagation 
of pornography and, thus, exacerbates inequality. Protecting the 
privacy and freedom of individuals to do and say as we wish in our 
private, intimate lives frees men to oppress, abuse, exploit or, in the 
extreme, to rape, and thereby further weaken women. Protecting 
freedom of speech and expression frees a society riddled by inequities 
to perpetuate, in the name of freedom of ideas, notions of gender 
59. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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roles that continue to impoverish women.60 Conversely, each gain in 
gender equality, like ·gains in equality generally, comes with the price 
of a diminution in individual freedom: a shrinking of First Amend-
ment freedoms in the case of pornography, a piercing of family and 
individual privacy in the case of domestic violence and inequitable 
allocation of responsibility for parenting, and a diminution of indi-
vidual liberty in the case of greater criminalization of sexual violence 
and greater enforcement of the sanctions already on the books. 
If this general political and philosophical point is right, then the 
constitutional strategy we should embrace to address the ill fit be-
tween our constitutional commitment to ordered liberty and women's 
needs seems clear enough. Advocates for women's interests should 
urge a general constitutional right to equality and then argue that 
the right to equality is of greater magnitude than the countervailing 
right, with which it is in tension, to individual liberty. If women are 
guaranteed equality, if'not through the failed ERA then through the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, . at least our 
commitment to liberty is limited by this counterbalancing commitment 
to equality. The Constitution, on this view, gives weight to both 
values, which are concededly in tension and which, accordingly, must 
be weighed and balanced against each other by a court or interpretive 
body sensitive to both. The Constitution, therefore, not only protects 
the individual's negative liberty to speak and to privacy, but also 
protects women's right to equality. Hence, limits on pornography 
may be not only constitutional, but constitutionally required. Simi-
larly, I have argued elsewhere, the so-called marital rape exemption-
which provides that nonconsensual sex within marriage is not rape 
and which is still in force in a number of states-may be unconsti-
tutional in spite of the infringement on marital privacy and individual 
liberty that the criminalization of marital rape entails. 61 Lastly, if 
this view is right, when individuals arrange their private affairs so 
as to allocate to women a grossly disproportionate amount of the 
unpaid and under acknowledged labor of raising the next generation, 
we face a problem of constitutional, not just moral and political, 
magnitude. 
I am in complete sympathy with the goal of women's equality 
and also have considerable sympathy for the particular arguments 
summarized above. There are, however, serious problems with the 
general conception of the Constitution on which these arguments 
rely. First, as a doctrinal matter, it is not at all clear that the 
60. See MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 30, at 195-214; MAC-
KINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 43, at 184-94. 
61. See West, Equality Theory, supra note 57; Note, To Have and To Hold: 
The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1255 (1986). 
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Constitution contains even a general commitment to anyone's equal-
ity, for women or for any other group. The Fourteenth Amendment 
does, of course, guarantee us equal protection of the law, but it is 
unlikely that the framers intended the clause to mean, or the Court 
will ever interpret it as meaning, that the Constitution requires the 
sort of social, political, and economic equality women lack and that 
is threatened by an unbridled liberal devotion to ordered liberty. 62 
As a purely strategic or prudential matter, then, the attempt to 
balance the commitment to liberty with a countervailing commitment 
of an equal constitutional magnitude to equality seems doomed to 
failure. There is no constitutional commitment to equality that comes 
anywhere near the weight, depth, breadth, history, or sincerity of 
our constitutional commitment to liberty. In any constitutional stand-
off between liberty and equality, liberty is going to win. Liberty is 
an unmistakably constitutional requirement as well as a political and 
moral aspiration, while equality is, at best, a political aspiration and, 
at various points in our history including most notably this one, not 
a widely shared one. 
The more basic problem, however, with this liberty versus equality 
view is that by conceiving of the needs, interests, and aspirations of 
women that are threatened by ordered liberty-interests in security, 
needs for economic self-suffiCiency, and aspirations for cultural and 
political participation-as being symptomatic of inequality, egalitar-
ians may have misdiagnosed the problem. The sorts of needs and 
interests at stake in these conflicts seem to be interests in, needs for, 
and aspirations of liberty, not equality. 63 Women need to be free of 
sexual violence both in the home and out in order not only to be 
equal, but also in order to be free in the most basic sense in which 
that ideal is ever invoked-to have freedom of movement from place 
to place at the time of one's choosing and for one's own chosen 
ends. While freedom from sexual violence ultimately would serve to 
equalize the relative social and economic positions of women and 
men, it is basically women's liberty and only secondarily women's 
equality that is lost when women lose the freedom to move about in 
public spaces free of the fear of molestation. Similarly, women need 
to be free of disproportionate obligations of labor in childraising not 
only in order to be equal, but also in order to be free to do other 
things-to be a fully participatory citizen, to work in the paid labor 
market, to create art, poetry, sculpture or ceramics, to philosophize, 
62. See Robin L. West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 111 (1991). It is worth noting that our 
popular fundamental texts-the Pledge of Allegiance, America the Beautiful, the 
Star Spangled Banner-make no mention of equality but repeated references to 
liberty. 
63. This was reflected in the since-discarded self-appellation of feminism 
during the sixties and early seventies as a movement of "Women's Liberation." 
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educate, or study. Again, freedom from unequal and unpaid child-
raising obligations unquestionably would serve to equalize women 
and men in any number of ways. What each woman loses when she 
is tied to burdensome and unfair domestic obligations, however, is 
not simply some share of an abstract group interest in the equality 
of women and men generally, but rather, and again in the most 
immediate sense imaginable, her own very individual and very per-
sonal liberty. 
What I want to suggest is that instead of trying to limit liberty 
by urging equality as a counterweight, we should undertake, instead, 
a reconstruction of the modern interpretation of ordered liberty 
presently dominating both doctrine and understanding so as to include 
the liberties women distinctively lack. The place that reconstruction 
should start, I submit, is with the possibility that the modern inter-
pretation of ordered liberty as protecting only negative liberty, and 
then only negative liberty infringed upon by the state rather than by 
other non-state authorities, is a flawed understanding of our consti-
tutional tradition. The two limitations defining the modern concep-
tion of ordered liberty and rendering the Constitution's promise so 
empty from the perspective of women's lives and needs are flatly 
unjustified, given the breadth of political vision that inspired the 
general phrases of the Fourteenth Amendment, including its guarantee 
of liberty. 
Let me begin with the distinction between negative and positive 
liberty. Whatever may be the merits of Berlin's assessment of the 
comparative abstract value of negative and positive liberty, it is far 
more consistent with the abolitionist history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to understand the liberty guaranteed by that amend-
ment's Due Process Clause in a positive rather than negative sense.64 
What the post-Civil War reconstruction amendments were about 
fundamentally, after all, was securing the positive liberties of citizen-
ship, self-governance, autonomy, and the end of bondage for the 
freed slaves.65 The war was not fought to ensure the privacy of the 
slave or to secure his negative right to read, think, act, and speak 
as he pleased free of state intervention. It just would not have been 
enough for the southern states to grant the slaves rights of privacy 
and liberty to read, think, and speak as they see fit yet leave them 
slaves-nonvoting, dependent, uncompensated, and unfree. In short, 
the war was not fought nor the reconstruction amendments passed 
to ensure the negative liberty of the slave. The war was fought (and 
surely this was primary) to ensure the slave's positive rights to self-
governance, independence, autonomy, and full citizenship. The right 
64. JACOBUS TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (originally THE ANTISLAVERY 
ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT) (1965). 
65. [d. at 234-39. 
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of the citizen to enjoy his liberty and the state's obligation not to 
deprive him of it other than by due process of law guaranteed by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be 
understood as including these positive rights of autonomy, economic 
self-sufficiency, and political self-governance. 
Second, at least judging by the federal legislation passed in their 
immediate wake, a goodly part of what those amendments were 
intended to ensure was the positive liberty of the newly freed slaves 
not just against pernicious state action, but also against pernicious 
private action, which included the private relationship of master and 
slave itself, the private lynchings by the Ku Klux Klan, and the 
private refusals of service by innkeepers.66 In the post-Civil War era, 
legislation and other actions taken by the southern states unques-
tionably endangered the freed slaves. The greatest threat to the slaves 
and to their very lives was not state action, however, but private 
action coupled with state inaction, or in other words, the states' 
refusal to act against life-threatening and highly organized attempts 
by private individuals and organizations to deprive the freed slaves 
of their lives and liberty. It was private, not state action, that posed 
the most immediate threat to both the negative and positive liberties 
of the freed slavesY Whatever else might be muddied about the 
intent of the framers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments, one thing is vividly clear from the Civil Rights legis-
lation and particularly the Ku Klux Klan Act that followed: What 
was sought by this profound enlargement of our constitutional charter 
was a guarantee from private violence and private oppression toward 
the freed slaves. This included private violence facilitated not only 
by actions taken by the states, but also by the states' inaction, 
whether by design or negligence, in the face of threats from private 
forces and individuals to the security of the former slaves' lives and 
freedoms. 
Thus, the most immediate history of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which is the necessary constitutional origin of our modern commit-
ment to ordered liberty, is profoundly at odds with the modern 
liberal conception of the liberty that amendment was intended to 
ensure. There is no doubt that the reconstruction amendments were 
intended in part to protect a sphere of negative liberty. By virtue of 
their slavery, the slaves indeed lacked what we now call the negative 
liberties of familial privacy: reproductive freedom, control, and re-
66. See Ku Klux Act of Feb. 28, 1971, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 
13; Public Accommodations Act of March I, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335. 
67. Such liberties would include the negative liberty to move freely about or 
simply to live, to contract to sell or buy property, or to earn a wage for one's labor 
and the positive liberty to vote, run for office, assume the rights and responsibilities 
of full political citizenship. 
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sponsibility; and freedom of thought and religion. There is also no 
doubt, though, that the reconstruction amendments were intended to 
wipe out slavery itself and not just these manifestations of it. They 
were intended to ensure not only these negative rights of free choice 
and privacy, but also the full positive liberty to which slavery is the 
absolute antithesis. There is also little doubt that the framers of the 
reconstruction amendments intended to render unconstitutional a 
wide range of state actions that were meant to maintain the actual 
if not the nominal relation of slave and master. But, again, it is 
absolutely clear not only from the record of the debate, but also by 
virtue of the wide-ranging legislation that followed their passage, that 
the amendments were intended to effect far more than pernicious 
state action. They also were intended to ensure freedom from private 
violence and oppression and to accomplish this by obligating the 
states to take affirmative action (to use a modern phrase) to prohibit, 
penalize, and criminalize (and thereby protect against) private dep-
rivations of that positive liberty. Lastly, according to· the explicit 
command of section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the amend-
ments were intended to ensure that if the states failed to act accord-
ingly Congress would act in their stead. 
Is there any modern lesson for contemporary life to be learned 
from this history? I think there is. As I have argued above, what 
women lack most profoundly in this culture is positive, not negative 
liberty. Women enjoy wide ranging rights to privacy, speech, thought, 
and religion. What women lack is the enjoyment of positive rights 
of autonomy, self-possession, economic self-sufficiency, and self-
governance, to say nothing of the full rights and responsibilities of 
citizenship. Furthermore, women lack these liberties not because of 
pernicious state action but because of widespread and disabling 
patterns of private discrimination, societal indoctrination, and per-
sonal, intimate sexual violence coupled with pernicious or at least 
negligent state inaction. These conditions appear to be invincible to 
constitutional challenge. Indeed, to some degree they appear to be 
constitutionally protected. The consequence is that many women are 
and feel themselves to be constitutionally disenfranchised. 
What I have argued in this paper is that we should be very 
cautious in identifying the cause of this disenfranchisement as our 
constitutional history and women's exclusion from it, rather than 
modern and contemporary understandings. The two limits most mod-
ern interpreters read into our conception of ordered liberty-a pref-
erence for negative liberty and an insistence on state action-are a 
product not of our constitutional history, but of modern habits of 
the heart and mind. In fact, as a matter of constitutional history, 
the liberal limits we impose on our conception of ordered liberty 
may be utterly unjustified. If our constitutional history and, hence, 
our inherited constitutional meanings are broader, more ambitious, 
and indeed nobler than we have grown to believe, then the disabling 
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contradiction between our constitutional aspirations of individual 
liberty on the one hand and our political (whether or not constitu-
tional) aspirations of political equality for women and men on the 
other may be more apparent than real. If so, then Congress and the 
states may have an affirmative obligation under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment not only to protect men and 
women's right to be left alone, but also to protect women against 
private infringements of their right to be free of sexual violence and 
to be free of onerous domestic responsibilities that deprive us of full 
economic and political autonomy. Finally, were Congress and the 
states to act on these obligations, then women, in spite of our 
historical exclusion from the process of constitutionalizing and 
amending this country's foundational beliefs, might come to have 
what women presently lack-some real stake in the constitutional 
system of rights and liberties that continues, however imperfectly, to 
give dignity to us all. 
